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 Abstract 
The purpose of this chapter is to compare negligence rules and strict liability rules and to 
examine the allocative effects resulting from the application of different liability regimes. It 
first discusses unilateral accidents, while the more complicated bilateral cases follow 
afterwards. Each section starts with a discussion of the rule of no liability before moving on to 
various forms of negligence and ending with various strict liability rules. At the end of each 
section, there is a discussion on how results change when relaxing specific assumptions. The 
various aspects are summarised focusing on the question of whether the outcome under a 
specific liability regime is efficient or not. We also discuss several more specific topics of 
interest, for example, the information generating consequence of negligence, the allocative 
effects of various liability rules when agents enter into a contractual relationship, product 
liability, cases of ‘joint liability’, the impact of uncertain legal standards, and the interaction 
between liability law and insurance. 
JEL classification: K0  
Keywords: Negligence, Strict Liability 
I. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to compare negligence rules and strict liability rules. They are 
the major rules of liability used in tort law to deal with situations where one person (the 
injurer) causes harm to another person (the victim). In England, France and Germany, for 
instance, the usual forms of liability are the comparative negligence rule and strict liability 
with the defence of relative negligence, and in the US it is the comparative negligence rule, 
the negligence rule with the defence of contributory negligence, and strict liability with the 
same defence. The details of these rules will be discussed below. Zweigert and Kötz (1996, 
secs. 40-43) provide a rigorous description of tort law in England, France and Germany. For 
the US, a good reference is Keeton et al. (1984, chs. 5, 11, 13).  
Historically, it is interesting to observe the changes in the relative importance of 
different liability rules. Before the nineteenth century, for instance, strict liability was 
predominant in most common law jurisdictions. In the early and mid-nineteenth century, 
however, this changed with negligence and fault becoming the prevailing standard of tort 
liability, as Schwartz (1981) notes. Since the twentieth century, rules of strict liability have 
enjoyed a renaissance and have been applied more and more to determine who should bear the 
costs of an accident and to what extent. A good example of this phenomenon is the shift back 
to strict liability in products liability cases. 
Moreover, tort law is much under debate because of the increasing number of cases 
where compensation for losses might substantially exceed the actual damage. In the US, for 
instance, damages awarded may exceed the losses sustained in the presence of ‘punitive’ 
damages where parties acted with ill will, i.e. when the harm was intentional, whereas in 
Germany higher awards are provided to give victims ‘satisfaction’ and to compensate them 
for nonpecuniary losses. The scope of harm and the size of judgements have become 
exceedingly expansive, and manufacturers pay extremely high premiums for products liability 
insurance to protect themselves against these awards. Many of them have withdrawn from the 
market entirely. This and various other results on the issue are presented by Priest (1991). 
Many economists and lawyers conclude that the tort system is in need of reform. Again, we 
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need to understand the basic principles of how different liability regimes work to be able to 
evaluate the alternatives to reform.  
Tort law is one of those areas in the law where (micro)economic models can be 
successfully applied. Tort is about damages and has important economic implications. The 
economic approach to tort is therefore mainly concerned with examining the allocative 
effects, i.e. welfare effects, resulting from the application of different liability regimes. 
Landes and Posner (1987, p. 6) suggest that liability rules can be interpreted as a legal attempt 
to establish incentives for parties to achieve social efficiency objectives. One of the path-
breaking studies in the development of the economic approach to tort is Calabresi (1970). The 
aim of tort law, he proposes, apart from the requirement for justice, is to minimise the social 
costs of a tort defined as the sum of total accident costs, administration costs, costs of 
properly allocating accident losses by means of insurance, and accident prevention costs of 
both the injurer and the victim. Again, the comparison between strict liability and negligence 
helps to determine which tort system is most suitable to improve welfare by, first, 
encouraging individuals to engage in safer activities by providing an incentive to do so, and 
second, encouraging individuals to make a given activity safer.  
Throughout, we will be considering models of accidents involving two individuals, the 
injurer and the victim. Both of them are engaged in some activity, and both of them exercise a 
certain level of care. The decisions the parties have to make are twofold. They have to decide 
how much care they want to exercise and how much they want to engage in an activity. It is 
plausible to assume that accident prevention costs increase with the amount of care taken, and 
that expected damages decrease with the level of care, but increase with the amount of 
activity the parties engage in.  
 In the remainder of this chapter, we will first discuss unilateral accidents because they 
describe those situations where one party, i.e. the victim, has no influence on the probability 
and the size of damages. Also, it is easier to understand the more complicated discussion of 
the bilateral case which follows. Each section starts with a discussion of the rule of no liability 
before moving on to various forms of negligence and ending with various strict liability rules. 
At the end of each section, there is also a discussion on how results change when relaxing 
certain assumptions. In later sections we concentrate on several more specific topics of 
interest. First we analyse the rules if standards of due care are ill-defined. Second we analyze 
the question as to whether the costs of litigation are higher or lower under strict liability as 
compared to negligence. Third we elaborate on the decentralisation effect of strict liability 
and of negligence. Fourth we provide the discussion of the information generating 
consequence of negligence. Fifth, we analyze the effect of under-compensation if the 
tortfeasor is judgment-proof. Sixth we provide an analysis of the allocative effects of various 
liability rules when agents enter into a contractual relationship, which also implies a brief 
discussion on the distinction between tort law and contract law. Seventh we elaborate on 
product liability. Eighth we provide an analysis of cases of ‘joint liability’, i.e. situations 
where more than one tortfeasor contributes to the occurrence of an accident. Ninth, we extend 
the analysis by allowing for risk-averse individuals and imperfect insurance markets. Tenth 
we analyze the effect of optimistic and pessimistic behaviour of the injurer on the efficiency 
of strict liability versus negligence. In the last part the various aspects of the comparison 
between liability rules are summarised focusing on the question of whether the outcome under 
a specific liability regime is efficient or not. 
II. Unilateral Accidents 
The discussion here is mainly based on Shavell (1987) and Schäfer and Ott (2005). In the case 
of unilateral accidents which we focus on in this section, it is assumed that the victim cannot 
influence the amount of expected damages. Also, to keep things simple, we further assume 
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that the level of activity is constant. (This assumption will be relaxed below.) Therefore, if we 
denote accident prevention costs by c, the level of care by x, and if d measures the total 
amount of expected damages, then, abstracting from administration costs and assuming risk 
neutrality, the social objective function takes the form of:  
 min c (x) + d (x)  (1) 
Setting the first derivative with respect to x equal to zero we obtain the following solution:  
 c' (x) = – d' (x)  (2) 
which simply states that the marginal cost to the injurer of taking an additional unit of care 
(left-hand side of equation (2)) should equal the marginal benefit to the victim represented by 
a reduction in the total amount of expected damages (hence the negative sign on the right-
hand side of equation (2)). It should now be clear why microeconomic models can be applied 
so easily in law and economics as equation (1) is an extremely simple example of a standard 
optimisation problem recurring very frequently in any area of economic analysis.  
 We now consider the behaviour of the injurer under various liability rules, providing 
important insights as to the efficiency of these rules. 
1. Rule of No Liability 
If the injurer cannot be held liable for the harm she causes, and if she therefore does not have 
to bear the costs of an accident, she will choose the lowest possible level of precaution in 
order to minimise her costs. Since we assume that the total amount of damages is a decreasing 
function of the precaution level, the accident costs will be extremely high. As a result, the 
outcome of this liability rule is clearly not socially optimal. 
2. Negligence 
Under the negligence rule, the injurer will be held liable only if she exercised precaution 
below a level usually determined by the law and/or by the court. This level is called 
reasonable care or due care. Posner (1972) proposed an economic efficiency criterion which 
could be used to identify the efficient precaution level to establish it as the legal standard. It 
should be borne in mind that one of the most important objectives of tort law is to give the 
injurer an incentive to apply the efficient level of care that fulfils the optimality condition (2). 
Interestingly enough, the first person to describe this legal standard of care was not an 
economist, but a judge. Learned Hand (1947) suggested that an injurer is liable if her burden 
B of adequate precautions is less than the probability P that the accident occurs, multiplied by 
the size L of the injury. Note that Judge Hand's statement of the rule is unclear as to whether it 
refers to total or marginal levels of benefits and costs of caretaking, but we assume that he had 
marginal values in mind. Stated in algebraic terms, an injurer is negligent if the condition  
 B < PL  (3) 
holds; and equality denotes optimality. 
If the injurer exercised due care, she will not be held liable for the costs of the 
accident. Let us now suppose that the court or the law would set the level of due care equal to 
the socially optimal level of care. Would the negligence rule result in the socially optimal 
level of care being taken? The answer is yes, as can be seen very easily by noting that a self-
interested person will choose her level of precaution to minimise her private costs. Would she 
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therefore want to choose a precaution level above the level of due care? No, because any care 
taken in excess of the standard set by the court would be more costly without reducing the 
costs of compensation since due care is enough to be non-liable. Would she, on the other 
hand, want to choose a precaution level below due care? No, because now she is running the 
risk of bearing the total amount of the expected damages.  
3. Relaxing Assumptions 
Note that in the previous section we made a few simplifying assumptions. First, we assumed 
that the court would set the level of due care equal to the socially optimal level. Second, it 
was assumed that the legal sanction imposed equals the harm actually caused and, third, the 
level of activity was held constant. We will now examine how the results change if we relax 
these assumptions one by one, i.e., we will discuss the effects of relaxing only one assumption 
at a time. Some of these issues are clearly presented by Cooter and Ulen (2004, chs. 8 and 9).  
Let us first examine the question of how the results of the previous section change 
when the court sets a level of due care that is not equal to the socially optimal level. Suppose, 
for instance, that the court does not require any precaution at all. Under these circumstances, 
it is obviously cheapest for the injurer not to exercise any care because she will escape 
liability even without taking any care at all. Taking greater care would have no advantage, but 
would involve additional costs. Put more generally, the potential injurer will satisfy the legal 
standard even if it is pegged below the socially efficient level. The same applies to a legal 
standard above the socially efficient level, with one important exception, though. If the 
amount of precaution costs at the legal standard exceeds the total amount of precaution and 
expected damage costs at the socially optimal care level, then the potential injurer will ignore 
the legal standard and set her caretaking level at the lower socially optimal care level. This 
result changes if the injurer is not held liable for the entire accident losses, but only for the 
amount of damage in addition to the damage that would have been caused if the injurer had 
exercised the level of care set by the courts (partial liability). See, for instance, § 249 BGB 
under German law. For the US, see Kahan (1989). The first authors to describe this case are 
Schäfer and Ott (1986). Here, it is optimal for the injurer to exercise socially optimal care 
even if the legal standard is pegged above the socially efficient level. This is because by 
exercising the efficient level of care instead of the higher legal standard, precaution costs 
decrease by more than the imposed legal sanction increases. In general, however, we can say 
that in order to obtain an efficient outcome the court needs to set the due level of care equal to 
the socially optimal level of care.  
Note also that it is very difficult for courts, legislatures and authorities to identify the 
efficient level of care in order to establish it as the legal standard. Due or reasonable care is 
usually identified by comparing what a reasonable person would have done under the 
circumstances with the actual precautionary activity of the injurer. An illustration of the 
reasonable person standard is provided by Posner (2007, p. 171). However, this standard is 
very vague and ‘flexible’. Therefore, an alternative to decide whether an injurer was negligent 
or not without a specific standard of care would be, first, to ask what an injurer could have 
done (alternatively or in addition) to prevent the damage or to reduce the probability that it 
occurs. Then, the costs of the alternative or of the additional precaution activity are 
determined. If either the difference between the actual precaution costs and the costs of the 
alternative precaution activity or the costs of the additional precaution activity are less than 
the reduction in the total amount of expected damages as a result of the alternative or 
additional activity, the injurer will be liable. 
Another assumption we made in the previous section is that the legal sanction imposed 
equals the harm actually caused. What will happen if we relax this assumption? Endres (1991, 
pp. 51-87) provides a rigorous and rather formal analysis of this question which is beyond the 
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scope of this article. From a more intuitive and less formal perspective we can say that, under 
the negligence rule, equality between harm and sanction is not essential as long as the 
sanction is sufficiently large so that the private costs of the injurer are minimised by 
conforming to the legal standard. However, once the legal sanction falls below a certain level, 
the injurer will minimise her costs by taking a level of precaution below the legal standard. 
Under-compensation is one possibility, but over-compensation can also occur. This 
applies especially in cases of pure economic losses. It is well established that tortuous acts 
might uno actu lead to gains of one party and to losses of another party. To illustrate: If a 
chartered accountant overlooked that real estate is grossly overvalued in the balance sheet and 
that consequently the company is overindebted and must file for bankruptcy, this might lead 
to an overvaluation of the company’s shares at the stock market. Some shareholders buy these 
overvalued shares and later suffer a loss, but those who sold the share at an overvalued price 
make a gain. They would have made a loss if the accountant had been careful. Both the loss 
and the gain were caused by the mistake of the accountant. If in that case the accountant is 
liable for the losses, his damage compensation is much higher than the social loss he caused. 
Whether this over-compensation results in over-deterrence depends on how the level of care is 
defined (Schäfer, 2004). If the level of care is well known and precisely defined, over-
compensation cannot result in over-deterrence because the tortfeasor can reach the due level 
of care and escapes any compensation. We will show later that this result does not apply if the 
standard of due care is “muddy” and only known as a distribution function. Then over-
compensation is likely to result in over-deterrence.  
Finally, we relax the assumption of a constant level of activity to study the effects of 
an increase in the injurer’s level of activity that will result in a proportional increase in the 
total amount of expected accident damages, given a specific level of care. This is essential 
when it comes to assessing the social utility of an activity. Finsinger and Pauly (1990) point 
out that the total net utility of a risky activity ought to be positive. 
The first aspect can be dealt with quite easily by slightly modifying the optimisation 
problem as represented in equation (1). The social objective function now has to take into 
account that various levels of activity influence the utility u of the actor who is the injurer. It 
is plausible to assume that utility is an increasing function of activity. Those who are familiar 
with optimisation problems should also note that for a unique solution to exist, it is necessary 
to assume further that the utility function is well-behaved. From the total amount of utility we 
need, of course, to subtract the total costs of care, which are assumed to be equal to the level 
of activity, a, multiplied by the level of care, x. Finally, we need to subtract the total amount 
of expected damages d. Thus we obtain as the social objective function 
 max u (a) – a x – a d (x)  (4) 
To solve this maximisation problem we first have to determine the optimal level of care x* by 
minimising the total costs of taking care as represented by the second and third terms in 
equation (4). Substituting into (4) and differentiating with respect to the level of activity we 
obtain 
 u' (a) = x* + d (x*) (5) 
which is the equivalent of equation (2) in the case of a constant level of activity. The 
interpretation is straightforward. The injurer should raise her activity as long as the marginal 
increase in utility she derives from raising activity exceeds the increment to total costs caused 
by doing so. 
We can now move on to discussing whether the negligence rule can guarantee that an 
activity is socially useful. A simple example might illustrate this point. Assume that the utility 
of an activity is 100. The costs of the optimal level of precaution are 80, and the amount of 
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total damages is 30. Since the victim has to bear the costs of the accident when the injurer 
exercises due care and, therefore, is not liable, the injurer has a benefit of 20 from engaging in 
her activity. However, the net utility of the activity is clearly negative, meaning that the 
injurer should not engage in the activity in the first place. Since injurers will escape liability 
by taking due care, they have no reason to consider the effect that their activities have on 
accident damages. As a result, the rule of negligence can create incentives to exercise an 
optimal level of precaution, but it is unable to ensure that the social utility of an activity is 
positive. 
Yet, there are exceptions where it can be easy for courts to observe the (lack of) social 
utility of an activity. In these cases, courts can set legal standards for both the optimal level of 
care and the optimal level of activity. However, because of information costs, it is generally 
difficult for courts to set both standards of caretaking and/or activity levels. Shavell (1987), 
and Landes and Posner (1987) focus on this issue. 
4. Strict Liability 
We will now turn the discussion to the major alternative of the rule of negligence: the rule of 
strict liability. Again, we start off by assuming that the legal sanction equals the actual 
damage and that the activity level is constant. Under strict liability, the courts do not have to 
set any level of due care because the injurer has to bear the costs of the accident regardless of 
the extent of her precaution. In this case, the expected amount of costs to the injurer of taking 
care x is 
 c (x) + d (x)  (6) 
i.e., the injurer faces the total amount of costs caused by the accident. Since it is the self-
interested injurer’s objective to minimise her private costs and since, under strict liability, the 
total social costs just equal her private costs, the injurer will have an interest to minimise total 
accident costs. In other words, the social objective function (1) and the private objective 
function resulting from minimising equation (6) are obviously identical. Therefore, under the 
rule of strict liability in the case of unilateral accidents, the injurer will choose the socially 
optimal level of care. 
As a result, both the rule of strict liability and the rule of negligence achieve the 
socially optimal level of care. There are, however, also quite a few differences. For instance, 
the division of costs under each rule is different. Under strict liability, the injurer has to bear 
the total amount of expected damages, whereas under the negligence rule, the victim has to 
bear the accident costs if the injurer exercised due care. Further differences appear when 
relaxing the assumptions we made. 
5. Relaxing Assumptions for Strict Liability 
As mentioned in the previous section, the courts do not have to set a level of due care. Under 
strict liability, all the courts need to do is to determine the size of the damage and to establish 
causation, whereas, under the negligence rule, the courts also need to determine the level of 
due care as a legal standard for the socially optimal level, and they have to determine the level 
of care actually taken in order to see whether the injurer was negligent or not. Proving 
negligence, however, can be difficult and costly. 
Shavell (1987, p. 264) argues that under strict liability the number of claims is likely 
to be higher than under negligence because the victim has an incentive to make a claim 
whenever her damages exceed the costs of making the claim. Under negligence, on the other 
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hand, the injurer can escape liability by demonstrating that she has not violated the legal 
standard of care. Since under the rule of strict liability it is not necessary to establish that the 
injurer was negligent, the probability of trial should be lower because it is easier to predict 
who is likely to win the case. Consequently, voluntary payments made in the shadow of the 
law should be much more probable. There is not only more potential for disagreement leading 
to trial under the negligence rule, it is also plausible to assume that the average administrative 
cost per claim is higher under negligence because the issue of negligence must be adjudicated, 
as was mentioned above. As a result, one can expect the average costs of resolving claims to 
be higher under negligence because of both a higher probability of trial and higher costs per 
trial.  
Another advantage of the rule of strict liability is that it is the injurer who has to bear 
the cost of searching for the optimal level of care, as Finsinger and von Randow (1991, p. 89) 
suggest. In many cases, he is better at deciding what precautions to exercise and to what 
extent he should do so because he is likely to be familiar with the hazardous activity. 
An assumption we made is that the legal sanction equals the damage actually caused. 
In the previous section we saw that equality is not essential as long as the sanction is 
sufficiently large for the injurer to conform to the legal standard. Under strict liability, this 
result changes quite drastically. Whenever damages are not perfectly compensatory, i.e., 
compensation is below the level that would make the victim indifferent between no accident 
and an accident with compensation, the potential injurer does not have an efficient incentive 
to exercise the socially optimal level of care.  
The easiest way to see this is by recalling optimality condition (2), which states that 
the marginal cost to the injurer of taking an additional unit of care should equal the marginal 
benefit to the victim represented by a reduction in the total amount of expected damages. Let 
us assume that the costs of taking care is a linear and increasing function of the level of care, 
i.e. any increase in the level of care leads to a proportional increase in accident prevention 
costs. We also assume that the functional relationship between the level of care and the 
reduction in accident damages is such that the exercise of precaution reduces expected 
damages, but at a decreasing rate. Expressed in more mathematical terms, the first derivative 
of this function is positive and the second derivative is negative. We now assume that the 
potential injurer knows and expects that the legal sanction generally does not equal the total 
amount of the accident damages, but that it equals a fraction of them only, because the 
tortfeasor remains anonymous, damages are higher than her personal wealth, victims are fully 
insured by first party or social insurance, or the damage is dispersed, which leaves the victim 
little incentive to litigate. This leads to a proportional downward shift of the damage reduction 
function. The crucial impact of the proportional shift is that, holding the level of care 
constant, the marginal reduction in damage and thus the marginal benefit of taking an 
additional unit of care is less than in the case of full compensation. Since, on the other hand, 
the cost function of taking care is assumed to be linear, the marginal cost of taking care 
remains constant. As a result, the optimality condition is no longer met under the 
circumstances given. In order for the cost minimising condition to be satisfied again, the 
potential injurer will reduce her level of care, which leads to an increase in the marginal 
reduction in damage by taking care. As a result, the potential injurer does not exercise the 
socially optimal level of care when damages are not perfectly compensatory. 
Suppose that the tort-liability system works imperfectly in the sense that only a 
fraction of all victims actually bring suit and recover. Let us call the ratio of compensated 
victims to the total number of victims the enforcement error. The efficiency loss due to 
enforcement errors can be offset by augmenting compensatory damages with punitive 
damages. In order to restore efficient incentives for the potential injurer to exercise optimal 
care we need a punitive multiple (a multiplicative factor by which compensatory damages are 
adjusted to offset the enforcement error) that equals the inverse of the enforcement error. If, 
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for instance, only half of the total number of victims actually bring suit, then the courts should 
double compensatory damages when calculating total damages. Thus, compensatory damages 
and punitive damages add up to total damages. References for issues related to punitive 
damages and their allocative effects are Cooter (1982) and Kolstad, Ulen and Johnson (1990). 
Finally, we relax the assumption of a constant level of activity. Recall that under 
negligence the net utility of an activity could be negative because the injurer had no reason to 
consider the effect that her activity had on others as she can escape liability by taking due 
care. Under strict liability, however, the injurer has to bear the total social costs of an 
accident, i.e., the sum of the total precaution costs and the total accident damages, regardless 
of the level of precaution she takes. She cannot escape liability, and the effects of activity on 
risk and accident costs are fully internalised. Therefore, the injurer will engage in an activity 
if and only if the net utility of that activity is positive.  
More generally, given the possibility of escaping liability, the injurer will not be 
motivated to consider the effect on the total amount of harm of the level at which she engages 
in her activity. She will consider her private benefits only. Any increase in activity, however, 
will raise the total amount of expected accident damages given the level of care. Thus, the 
injurer will choose too high a level of activity (see for example Polinsky, 1980). Under strict 
liability, the injurer internalises the total amount of social costs and reduces the level of 
activity to the socially optimal level. This conclusion was first clearly stated by Shavell 
(1980). 
6. Liability and Uncertain Legal Standards of Due Care 
In the real world, legal standards of due care are frequently uncertain. Factors leading to 
uncertainty are, amongst others, courts’ errors in determining due levels of care, courts’ errors 
in assessing a party’s true level of care, and parties’ inability to control their momentary level 
of care. Craswell and Calfee (1984) focus on this issue. These sources of uncertainty change 
the deterrent impact of legal rules by creating two opposing effects. These effects can give 
even risk-neutral parties an incentive to over-comply or under-comply. Over-compliance 
enables potential injurers to increase the chance that they will not be held responsible for the 
social costs of their behaviour, thus giving themselves a margin of error to be sure that they 
avoid liability. However, uncertainty also reduces incentives to comply by creating a positive 
chance that someone who exerts less than efficient care will not be held liable. 
In order to determine whether the net incentives are to under-comply or to over-
comply, we need to know the relative strength of these two effects. 
 
If the level of due care (x) is ill-defined, the tortfeasor knows only a probability 
distribution function, which attaches a probability of being liable (h) in case of an accident to 
every costs of care c(x). This probability (h(x)) decreases with x. In that case the cost function 
of the tortfeasor is  
 min c(x) + d(x)h(x)   This yields the first order condition (16) 
 c'(x)+d’(x)h(x)+h’(x)d(x)=0 (17) 
It is easy to see that this might lead to over- or to under-deterrence. Efficient 
deterrence will be provided only if the first order condition is met at the efficient level (cost) 
of care (x*), i.e. if 
 c'(x)+d’(x*)h(x*)+h’(x*)d(x*)=0 (18) 
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In other words: Muddy standards of due care might result in over-deterrence or in under-
deterrence. The intuition behind this is the following. Whenever the tortfeasor increases her 
care level she faces three rather than two effects. Her costs of care increase, the expected 
damages she causes decrease and the probability of being held negligent also decreases. 
Depending on whether at the efficient level of care the two cost decreasing effects or the cost 
increasing effect of one more monetary unit of care is higher, the tortfeasor will reach a level 
of care which is either higher or lower than the efficient level of care. 
 
We have already discussed that the damage compensation might be lower or – as in 
the case of pure economic losses – higher than total damages. To analyse the incentive effect 
of over- or under-compensation we assume that damage compensation is md with m≠ 1. Then 
with m<1 we have under-compensation, otherwise over-compensation. Consequently, the cost 
function to be minimized becomes 
 min c(x) + md (x)h(x)        This yields the first order condition (19) 
 d’(x)h(x)+h’(x)d(x)=-c'(x)/m (20) 
In the case of under-compensation it is still uncertain whether under- or over-
deterrence results, depending on the probability distribution function and on the damage 
function. It is, however, certain, that with a decreasing m under-deterrence must result if m 
becomes lower than a certain threshold value. If, for instance, 0m→ , it is obvious that the 
right hand side of (20) reaches a very high absolute value and therefore the equation is 
fulfilled only at very low values of x, indicating under-deterrence. 
In the case of over-compensation, which we discussed for pure economic loss, we get 
a symmetric result. Over-compensation does not lead to over-deterrence in the negligence 
regime, as long as the standard of due care is precisely defined. If the standard is known only 
as a probability distribution, over-compensation must result in over-deterrence if m becomes 
large enough. 
Over-deterrence or under-deterrence becomes certain in the case of over-compensation 
under the strict liability rule. With damage compensation of md and 1m ≠  the maximisation 
problem is 
 min c(x) + md (x)       This yields the first order condition (21) 
 c'(x)+md’(x)=0 (22) 
This cannot yield the optimal result, which is c'(x)+d’(x)=0. Over-compensation 
(m>1) always leads to over-deterrence, and under-compensation (m<1) always leads to 
under-deterrence. Again, negligence is the more robust system if one relaxes assumptions and 
allows for damage awards that are higher or lower than the damages.  
III. Bilateral Accidents 
We now extend the analysis made above to cases where both parties in an accident may 
contribute to the accident costs. Again, this section is based mainly on Schäfer and Ott (2005), 
Shavell (1987), but also on Adams (1985), and Cooter and Ulen (2004). One of the first 
economists to study these issues was Brown (1973), who introduced the use of the assumption 
that the probability that an accident will occur is a function of the caretaking of both the 
tortfeasor and the victim. In fact, it is rare that an accident is due to one party (i.e. the injurer) 
only. It is much more common that the victim can also exercise some precaution to prevent an 
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accident. What makes bilateral accidents quite a complicated issue analytically is the 
interdependence of the parties' behaviour. We will see that in many cases the choice of one 
party in terms of levels of activity and care essentially depends on the other party’s choice. 
Since we now also have to take into account the victim’s ability to reduce the 
probability or size of an accident, we need to modify the social objective function given 
above. If we denote the level of care taken by the injurer by x, as before, and if y measures the 
level of care taken by the victim, the social objective function now becomes 
 min c (x) + c (y) + d (x,y)  (7) 
where d(x,y) denotes the total amount of expected damages which, of course, depends on the 
level of care exercised by both parties. Let x* and y* denote the socially optimal values of x 
and y. 
There are now two conditions determining the optimal levels of care. First,  
 c' (x) = – dx (x,y*)  (8) 
with dx being the partial derivative of d with respect to x and with y assumed to be optimal. 
What it says is that the marginal cost to the injurer of taking an additional unit of care should 
equal the marginal benefit of the reduction in the expected cost of the accident, provided that 
the victim chooses the socially optimal level of care. Second, 
 c' (y) = – dy (x*,y)  (9) 
which says that the marginal cost to the victim of increasing her level of care should equal the 
marginal benefit of the expected reduction in accident costs, provided that the injurer chooses 
the socially optimal level of care. The fact that the socially optimal solution requires that both 
parties exercise optimal care will be crucial in the analysis that follows. 
1. The ‘Cheapest Cost Avoider’ 
Before discussing and comparing the various liability rules in the case of bilateral accidents 
we want to examine cases which exhibit properties of both unilateral and bilateral accidents. 
This version can emerge when either the injurer or the victim (or a third person) is able to 
prevent the accident. Note the distinction: Unlike in the case of unilateral accidents, it is now 
not only the injurer, but also the victim who can prevent the accident. And unlike in the case 
of bilateral accidents where typically both parties need to exercise care to achieve the socially 
optimal and efficient outcome, it is now either the injurer or the victim who has to take care to 
achieve the socially optimal result. 
As Calabresi (1970) argues, in these cases, the person should be held liable who could 
have prevented the accident with the least cost of taking care (the cheapest cost avoider). The 
idea is quite simple: We know that as long as property rights are well-defined and there are no 
transaction costs, trade between agents would result in an efficient allocation of resources 
when there is an externality, a conclusion commonly known as the Coase Theorem (see 
Coase, 1960). Furthermore, note that what is known as causation in tort law can be 
reinterpreted as an externality in economics. An externality can be defined as a cost that the 
action of a person imposes on others without their consent. The prevention of an accident 
would therefore be undertaken by the cheapest cost avoider. However, this solution will not 
be achieved because of prohibitive ex ante costs of bargaining about who should be held 
liable for possible accident damages. In this case, the courts should place the burden of 
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covering the costs of the accident on the individual who can avoid the accident at the lowest 
cost no matter whether it is the injurer, the victim, or a third party. 
This principle of cheapest cost avoider does however not lead to first best results if 
one relaxes informational assumptions (Garoupa and Dari-Mattiacci, 2009). If both the victim 
and the tortfeasor can take care and if it is efficient that only one of them should take care, the 
cheapest cost avoider principle leads to the first best outcome as long as the identity of the 
cheapest cost avoider is known ex-ante, i.e. when the actors take decisions to take care. This 
is often the case. For instance house owners are not supposed to invest against damages from 
trucks hitting their houses and they as well as the truck owners know this. But often the 
cheapest cost avoider is identified only ex post in the courtroom. In that case the parties know 
only a distribution function denoting the probability that the court will identify one of them as 
the cheapest cost avoider. If both parties fix their level of care simultaneously, the cheapest 
cost avoider might underinvest and the other party who should not take any care in the first 
best solution might overinvest. The problem is even aggravated if care is allocated 
sequentially. In that case the first mover will always invest regardless whether she is the 
cheapest cost avoider and the second mover might invest nothing, even if she is the cheapest 
cost avoider.  
2. Rule of No Liability 
As before, if the injurer cannot be held liable for the harm she causes, she will choose the 
lowest possible level of care, i.e. is zero, to minimise her cost. This may also lead the victim 
to exercise excessive care. As we have seen in the previous section, this is clearly not optimal 
because accident costs will be excessively high. 
3. Negligence 
Recall that the rule of negligence imposes the obligation to satisfy a legal standard of care 
usually defined as due care. The injurer is therefore liable unless he can prove that he has 
exercised due care. We now continue our analysis by introducing, discussing, and comparing 
several forms of the negligence rule (see for example Wittmann, 1986; Haddock and Curran, 
1985). Let us begin with the simplest form of negligence. 
Simple Negligence 
The properties of this rule are basically the same as in the unilateral case, i.e., the injurer is 
liable if and only if her level of precaution is below the legal standard regardless of the 
precaution level exercised by the victim. Assume now that the level of due care chosen by the 
courts equals the socially optimal level. Injurers will therefore have an incentive to exercise 
due care in order to escape liability. Hence, the victim faces the costs 
 c (y) + d (x*,y)  (10) 
and will choose the level of care that minimises this expression. Setting the first derivative 
with respect to y equal to zero we obtain equation (9), one of the two optimality conditions in 
the bilateral case. 
If the injurer expects that the self-interested victim will exercise due care, the same 
arguments as in the unilateral case apply. The injurer faces the costs 
 c (x) + d (x,y*)  (11) 
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and will choose the level of care that minimises this expression. Again, setting the first 
derivative with respect to x equal to zero we obtain equation (8), the other optimality 
condition in the bilateral case. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the simple negligence rule leads to socially optimal 
levels of care. The outcome is a Nash equilibrium which can be expected to emerge 
instantaneously because a rationally self-interested person will assume that another equally 
self-interested person has decided to exercise efficient precaution and, that being so, it is 
reasonable for that person also to exercise efficient precaution. Generally, a pair of strategies 
is said to be a Nash equilibrium if player A’s choice is optimal given B’s choice, and player 
B’s choice is optimal given A’s choice. It is standard in the literature to assume the existence 
of a Nash equilibrium. However, there might be problems of existence, even in the case of 
well-behaved functions (see, for example, Endres and Querner, 1995). It is also standard to 
discuss bilateral accidents in the context of a Nash framework (for a reference that points to 
alternative approaches see Endres, 1992). Finally, note that under the rule of simple 
negligence there is no need to establish a legal standard of care for the victim. This conclusion 
changes under the following rules. 
Negligence with the Defence of Contributory Negligence 
Under this rule, the injurer will be held liable if she does not take due care while the victim 
does. The injurer will not be held liable if she either takes due care or if the victim does not 
take care. In other words, in comparison to simple negligence, the injurer now has, apart from 
exercising due care, an additional possibility to escape liability by showing that the victim 
failed to take due care. To see whether this rule leads to a socially optimal outcome, we can 
use the same line of argument as before. If the injurer assumes that the victim takes due care 
to avoid liability, she will also have an incentive to do so for the same reason. This, in turn, 
leads the victim to take due care because she now has to bear the total amount of damages. 
She can minimise these costs by taking due care. Since the injurer is aware of this, it is 
reasonable for her to take due care herself and so on. Again, we have a stable and unique 
equilibrium, and a socially optimal result will be achieved. 
Comparative Negligence Rule 
The difference between this rule and the two previous ones is that, when both parties are 
negligent, the accident costs are divided between them in proportion to the extent of their 
negligence. One way of doing this is to calculate the ratio of the differences between the due 
level of care and the actual level of care. 
If the courts choose optimal levels of due care, then both the injurer and the victim 
will exercise due care. The rationale is precisely the same as before. Again, we can conclude 
that the outcome under this rule is socially optimal.  
When comparing the various versions of the negligence rule we come to the 
conclusion that none of these versions is more or less efficient than the others (efficiency 
equivalence theorem, see Orr, 1991; Rubinfeld, 1987). They all lead to socially optimal 
outcomes, provided that the courts set the legal standard of precaution at the efficient level, 
because self-interested agents have an incentive to choose the legal standard of care. The 
reason for this is, in essence, that whenever one party exercises due care, then it is entirely 
upon the other party to decide whether it alone will be held liable by failing to take due care. 
However, as White (1989) argues, there is empirical evidence that, in contrast to the 
equivalence theorem, contributory negligence provides better incentives to avoid accidents. If 
actors are risk averse and insurance markets are imperfect, relative negligence leads to a better 
risk allocation than contributory negligence, as it burdens the tortfeasor as well as the victim, 
if both are negligent.  
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An analysis of how these results change when relaxing and modifying some of the underlying 
assumptions will be given later. First we will examine various forms of strict liability. 
4. Strict Liability 
As in the previous section, there are several forms of the strict liability rule to consider. We 
begin with the simplest form of strict liability. 
Simple Strict Liability 
In this case, the injurer has to bear the total amount of accident costs regardless of the extent 
of her precaution. Conversely, the victim will be compensated for all costs imposed on her, 
which implies that the victim’s marginal benefit of taking an additional unit of care is zero for 
any level of care. Thus, it is optimal for the victim to choose a zero level of care because at 
zero level the marginal cost of taking care equals zero, and her private optimality condition is 
satisfied. Of course, optimality condition (9) is not met and the outcome is not socially 
optimal because the marginal benefit of increasing the level of care exceeds the marginal cost 
to the victim. 
Strict Division of Losses 
Under this liability rule, the injurer has to pay a fraction f of the accident costs. Hence, the 
injurer faces the costs 
 c (x) + f * d (x,y)  (12) 
and the victim faces the costs 
 c (y) + (1 – f) * d (x,y) (13) 
It is crucial to note that the size of the fraction is assumed to be independent of the parties’ 
levels of care. Thus, the first order conditions are 
 c' (x) = – f * dx (x,y) (14) 
and 
 c' (y) = – (1 – f) * dy (x,y) (15) 
Comparing these optimality conditions with conditions (9) and (11) it is clear that, at any 
level of care, the marginal benefit of taking care is lower under strict division. Since parties 
save only a fraction of the true reduction in accident losses by taking care, they have too little 
incentive to exercise a socially optimal level of care. 
Strict Liability with the Defence of Contributory Negligence  
Under this rule, the injurer is liable for the accident losses unless the victim's level of care was 
lower than her due level of care. It is straightforward to show that under this rule the outcome 
is socially optimal, provided that the courts set the level of care for victims equal to the 
socially optimal level of care. The rationale is the same as under the various versions of the 
negligence rule. Since injurers will be liable for accident damages if victims take due care and 
therefore will not bear the accident costs, injurers will exercise due care to minimise accident 
costs. On the other hand, victims will exercise due care because they do not want to be found 
contributorily negligent. Again, the result is a socially optimal Nash equilibrium.  
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Strict Liability with the Defence of Relative Negligence  
This rule is basically the same as the previous one with the following difference: If the victim 
is found negligent because she failed to take due care, she will have to bear only a fraction of 
her losses. If the fraction depends on the victim's actual level of care relative to due care, if it 
is sufficiently large, and if the courts choose the legal level of care equal to the socially 
optimal level of care, then the outcome is socially efficient. The rationale is the same as 
before.  
5. Relaxing Assumptions 
Recall the first simplifying assumption that the court sets the level of due care equal to the 
socially optimal level. In the section on unilateral accidents, we conclude that under strict 
liability the courts need only determine the size of the damage, whereas under negligence the 
courts must in addition calculate the socially optimal level of due care, and they have to 
determine the level of care actually taken in order to see whether the injurer was negligent or 
not. 
In bilateral accidents, however, this result holds true only for the rule of simple strict 
liability which, as we saw in the previous section, does not achieve socially efficient results. 
Those forms of strict liability that lead to socially optimal outcomes have the same 
requirements with respect to their ease of application as the various rules of negligence. The 
only difference affecting the ease of application of the two rules is that under strict liability 
the courts do not need to determine the actual level of care of the injurer. 
The second assumption concerns the equality between the legal sanction and the 
damage actually caused. In the case of unilateral accidents we see that, whenever damages are 
not perfectly compensatory, the potential injurer does not have an efficient incentive to 
exercise the socially optimal level of care. In the case of bilateral accidents, this result holds 
true only for, first, the potential injurer, and second, under the rule of simple strict liability. 
For instance, it is important to note that, under simple strict liability, under-
compensation would tend to create an incentive for the victim to exercise precaution by 
creating some residual liability. This is also how insurance companies deal with the problem 
of moral hazard. Since, however, the incentive problem of the potential injurer remains 
unsolved, under-compensation cannot lead to socially optimal results. 
Also, we should note that under the rules of strict liability with the defence of 
contributory or relative negligence, equality between the legal sanction and the harm does not 
matter as long as the sanction is sufficiently large so that the private costs of the parties are 
minimised by conforming to the legal standard. These are, of course, the same results as under 
the rules of negligence. 
Finally, the third assumption refers to the constant level of activity. Recall that in the 
case of unilateral accidents the rule of strict liability and the rule of negligence produced 
different results. Under negligence, the injurer had no reason to consider the effect that her 
activity has on others and would therefore choose too high a level of activity. Under strict 
liability, on the other hand, the injurer internalises the total amount of social costs and 
therefore reduces the activity level to the socially optimal level. The crucial condition in order 
for any liability rule to lead to a socially efficient level of activity is that the parties engaging 
in some activity must bear the total amount of accident losses. Otherwise only a fraction of 
the activity’s costs are internalised, and the level of activity will be too high. As a matter of 
fact, though, it is impossible for both parties to bear the accident losses.  
Therefore, results change quite drastically in the case of bilateral accidents as 
compared to unilateral accidents. As Shavell (1987, p. 29) puts it, the reason, in essence, is 
that for injurers to choose the correct level of activity they must bear accident losses, but for 
victims to choose the correct level of activity they, too, must bear accident losses. Yet, of 
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course, injurers and victims cannot both bear accident losses under a liability regime, but the 
problem can be nicely solved by using Pigou taxes, which has led Baumol and Oates (1988) 
to prefer a system of Pigou taxes to liability as a matter of principle. Under a Pigou tax the 
injurer minimises the sum total of damages and abatement costs. As the payment goes to the 
state rather than the victim, the victim has an incentive to do the same. Consequently the pair 
of optimal abatement costs of the injurer and the victim is a Nash equilibrium.  
As a result, in bilateral accidents no liability rule leads to socially optimal levels of 
activity. This implies that the net utility of an activity can be negative, as the following 
example illustrates. In bilateral accidents, an activity is socially useful if the utility to the 
injurer less the precaution costs to both the injurer and the victim less the costs of the accident 
is positive. Assume now that the utility is 100, optimal precaution cost to the injurer is 40, 
optimal precaution cost to the victim is 30, and the expected accident cost is 50. Obviously, 
the activity is not socially useful because its net utility is negative. Note, however, that under 
both the rule of negligence and the rule of strict liability the injurer will engage in the activity. 
Under negligence, his private utility is 100 - 40 = 60, and under strict liability, his private 
utility is 100 - 40 - 50 = 10. This is because, as noted above, the injurer does not take into 
consideration the precaution cost of the victim. 
A theoretical possibility to achieve a socially optimal outcome would be to establish 
the legal obligation for the injurer to bear her own precaution cost, the accident cost, and also 
the precaution cost of the victim (see for example Rose-Ackerman, 1989). 
 
A particular problem with consequences on the efficiency ranking of the negligence 
rule vis-a-vis the strict liability rule is interdependence between victims (Friehe, 2007). Here 
the damage for each particular victim decreases with the level of care of the tortfeasor and a 
particular victim's level of care but it increases with the level of care of other victims. This 
constellation is often observed in crime behaviour. If potential victims of crime invest in 
safety and if the criminals know this, the investment will reduce the crime rate but will also 
divert crime to other victims with lower investment levels. This effect might give incentives 
to increase the private investment against crime above its socially optimal level. A similar 
effect can arise in tort law. Wild animals from a forest can destroy crops of farmers. The 
forest owner as well as each farmer can reduce damages. But if the farmer invests, he also 
diverts animals to other farmers. In this case the negligence rule with the defence of 
contributory or comparative negligence cannot induce the first best outcome, whereas the 
strict liability rule with the defence of contributory or comparative negligence leads to 
efficient levels of care.  
 
To analyse this, assume one tortfeasor who invests x and two victims who invest y1 
and y2 to reduce damages. Assume further that there exists a triple of strictly positive optimal 
levels of care {x*,y1*,y2*} which lead to optimal damages d1* and d2* for the two victims. 
Assume further the existence of a negligence rule with the defence of contributory or 
comparative negligence. And assume that courts define the optimal levels of care as the due 
levels of care. This implies that victims bear all costs of accidents under the efficient 
combination of costs of care. We ask whether this combination {x*,y1*,y2*} is a Nash 
equilibrium. The tortfeasor has no incentives to deviate from the social optimum, as otherwise 
she must pay damages, which are by definition of optimality higher than her savings of care 
costs. (In the case of full liability as opposed to partial liability they are even higher by the 
fixed amount of d1*+d2* as the residual risk shifts from the victim to the tortfeasor as soon as 
the tortfeasor is negligent). In the social optimum {x*,y1*,y2*} both victims have to bear the 
damages because the tortfeasor is not negligent. If victim 1 increases her costs of care above 
y1*, this has two effects. It reduces the damages of victim 1 partly because fewer damages 
occur. But by definition of optimality this decrease must be lower than the additional 
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expenses. However it also decreases the damages of victim 1 by an additional amount and 
increases the damages of victim 2 by the same amount. Due to this diversion effect it is 
privately profitable for victim 1 to invest more than y1*. The same reasoning applies for 
victim 2. Consequently the efficient combination of levels of care {x*,y1*,y2*} is not a Nash 
equilibrium under the negligence rule and victims have an incentive to overinvest.  
 
This odd consequence cannot happen under a strict liability rule with the defence of 
contributory or comparative negligence. We again ask whether the triple {x*,y1*,y2*} is a 
Nash equilibrium. We again assume that the courts fix the due level of care of victims at y1* 
and y2* respectively. Victim 1 has no incentives to increase her costs of care above y1. 
Otherwise her costs of care would increase, but the resulting damage reduction would only 
reduce the damage compensation of the tortfeasor which leaves victim 1 with a pure increase 
of her costs. Victim 1 has also no incentives to reduce the costs of care below the optimal 
level, as this would lead to negligence and burden her with all damages thereby increasing her 
total costs in spite of the savings of costs of care. The same reasoning applies for victim 2. 
The tortfeasor has no incentive to deviate from x* either because - by definition of optimality 
- a reduction of the cost of care below x* would increase the damage compensation by more 
than the saved amount of costs of care. And for the same reason an increase of the costs of 
care above x* would reduce damages and damage compensation by less than the additional 
costs of care. In case of the described interdependence of victims therefore the strict liability 
provides efficient deterrence whereas negligence results in overinvestment on the side of the 
victims.  
IV. Litigation Costs 
The cost of litigation might be higher or lower under strict liability as compared to 
negligence, depending on various factors. First, the number of cases which lead to a damage 
compensation is strictly higher under strict liability than under negligence because under 
negligence some losses are borne by the victim whereas under strict liability any loss caused 
by the tortfeasor leads to compensation. Second, the degree of legal certainty is higher under 
strict liability as compared to negligence. Under strict liability the plaintiff has to give 
evidence on causation and on the level of damages. Under negligence, the plaintiff has also to 
show that the tortfeasor did not reach the due level of care. As the due level of care is often 
ill-defined ex-ante, there are more cases under negligence in which plaintiff and defendant 
might have different views on the outcome of litigation and, therefore, go to court. Under 
strict liability, however, the quota of cases in which the outcome is clear must be higher. 
Therefore, the quota of cases in which damage compensation is paid in the shadow of the law, 
without litigation, is higher under strict liability. In these cases, the costs of transferring 
wealth from the tortfeasor to the victim are relatively low. Third, the cases which lead to 
litigation cause less litigation costs under strict liability as compared to negligence because 
less information (on causation and on the level of damages) is needed under strict liability as 
compared to negligence as an additional requirement for a damage award. 
In cases of bilateral damages, however, the cost advantage of lower costs of litigation 
per case might disappear. In that case the court has to fix a due level of care for the victim 
(y*). For this level to be efficient, the court must know the injurer’s (x*) as well as the 
victim’s efficient care to be able to arrive at the socially efficient combination of care levels 
(x*,y*). 
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V. The Decentralisation Effect of Strict Liability and Negligence 
An important advantage of strict liability is seen in its decentralisation or self-selection effect 
(Cooter and Ulen, 2004, p. 388). If different tortfeasors have different costs of care, the 
optimal level of care, which minimises the sum of the costs of care and the expected damages, 
is different for each tortfeasor and it decreases with increasing per unit costs of care. Under 
strict liability each tortfeasor has an incentive to minimise these costs as they are the costs of 
the society as well as her private total costs. This leads to a self-selection and tortfeasors with 
high per unit costs of care will exhibit a lower level of care than tortfeasors with low unit 
costs of care. Therefore strict liability leads every individual tortfeasor to reach the cost 
minimising and socially optimal care level. 
It has been argued that this efficiency result is not reached under a negligence regime, 
in which courts fix a due level of care according to the “reasonable man” standard or the pater 
familias standard. If this due level of care is somewhere in the middle between the optimal 
standard of a high and a low cost tortfeasor, both of them get the wrong incentives and the 
low cost tortfeasor allocates too little care and the high cost tortfeasor allocates too much care. 
Several authors have shown that this argument is not quite right for several reasons 
(Rubinfeld, 1987; Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, 2003; Miceli, 2006). They have also shown that 
somewhat different rules of negligence can lead to an efficient self-selection of tortfeasors 
also under a negligence standard.  
Sometimes courts can observe that optimal standards are different for different groups 
of tortfeasors. Then they can fix different levels of due care. For instance courts often fix due 
levels of care which are higher for experts than for laypeople. This leads experts to use a high 
level of care and laypeople to use a comparatively low level of care, which are both efficient. 
But self-selection of different groups of tortfeasors also occurs if courts cannot observe 
different costs of care of different groups of injurers and have no choice but to fix one due 
level of care for all potential injurers. 
If courts use the reasonable man standard and if this standard is too low for some 
tortfeasors and too high for others, it is certain that those with low per unit costs of care will 
reach this standard to avoid liability. Therefore they reach a level of care at which one 
additional unit of care will reduce the expected damages by more than one unit. This leads to 
inefficiency. The incentive effects of the reasonable man standard on tortfeasors with high per 
unit costs of care are however ambiguous. At the reasonable man standard the costs of care 
for the tortfeasor with high unit costs of care are higher than his optimal costs of care. He will 
reach the due level of care as long as the sum total of his optimal costs of care plus the 
damage compensation at this level of care are higher than the costs of due care. To illustrate, 
assume that the costs of due care are 30, the optimal costs of care for the high cost tortfeasor 
are 10 and the damages are 15 at this level of care. In this case, the tortfeasor will allocate 
efficient care and pay damages as his total costs are then lower than 30. If, however, at the 
efficient level of care the damages are 25, he will comply with the standard. In the first case 
the negligence rule leads to efficient incentivesfor high cost tortfeasors whereas in the second 
case this result is not obtained. Those groups of tortfeasors with an efficient level of care 
which is lower than the due level of care will sometimes have incentives to reach the due level 
of care and sometimes they will get incentives to reach the efficient level of care. The latter 
result usually occurs if the due level of care is very much higher than the efficient level of 
care. 
The consequences of a reasonable man standard if injurers have different costs are 
again different if the liability rule is the so-called partial liability, also known as the 
“difference principle” (Kahan 1989). Under this rule, damage compensation of the careless 
injurer is always the difference between the harm done and the harm which would have 
occurred at the due level of care. It is interesting that this rule guarantees that a tortfeasor will 
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reach the efficient level of care whenever the due level of care is higher than the efficient 
level of care. To understand this result, assume that the tortfeasor reaches the due level of care 
with a certain amount of costs. In that case he pays no damages. If – starting from the due 
level of care – he reduces his care level to a level which is still inefficiently high, he pays only 
the damages which he actually causes by deviating from the due level of care. By definition of 
efficiency, however, his cost of care savings must then exceed the additional damage he 
causes. This argument holds until the tortfeasor has reached her efficient level of care. 
Therefore under the difference principle the reasonable man standard leads to inefficiently 
low care for tortfeasors with low per unit costs whose efficient level of care is higher than the 
due level of care. It leads however to self-selection of tortfeasors whose unit costs of care are 
high and whose optimal level of care is lower than the due level of care. All of them have an 
incentive to allocate efficient care. 
Miceli (2006) used this insight to criticise the reasonable man standard, which is lower 
than the efficient care level of some tortfeasors and higher than the efficient level of other 
tortfeasors. He proposed a standard of due care which is equal to the efficient care level of the 
tortfeasor with the lowest per unit costs of care. Such a standard would hold injurers to the 
“highest degree of vigilance, care and precaution” (Miceli, 2006, p. 359). This would lead to a 
self-selection of all injurers with different costs of precaution. Each of them would have 
incentives to reach her efficient level of care just as under strict liability. This favourable 
result hinges however on the smooth working of the difference principle. 
Summarising, we can say that strict liability leads to a perfect and efficient self-
selection of all injurers with different per unit costs of care. It is not true that no self-selection 
exists under negligence. But the same desirable result as under strict liability is only obtained 
under a negligence standard of the “highest degree of vigilance” as compared to the 
“reasonable man standard”. This is not enough. This rule must be combined with a 
comprehensive form of the difference principle. Full self-selection of injurers with different 
costs of care under negligence would therefore require far-reaching changes of the negligence 
rule and the strict use of the difference principle (partial liability). 
VI. The Information Generating Consequence of Negligence 
Negligence generates public information on safety technology 
The negligence rule is usually the base line. In civil law countries, negligence is the general 
rule and strict liability is an exceptional rule codified in specific statutes. In common law 
countries, strict liability is imposed in case of abnormal dangerousness of an activity (Posner, 
2005; Rosenberg, 2007). It is difficult to see what explains this. Strict liability with the 
defence of contributory or comparative negligence leads to efficient results in most cases. 
Negligence leads to efficient results only if courts fix a due level of care that is equal to the 
efficient level of care, or if they fix a due level of care that is too high (under partial liability) 
or much too high (under full liability), so that the tortfeasor prefers the efficient level of care 
even if this leads to compensation. The strict liability rule, therefore, seems to dominate the 
negligence rule in terms of giving the right incentives. 
One can argue that negligence is superior to strict liability because it generates more 
public information about the due and the efficient level of care (Ott and Schäfer, 1997; Feess 
and Wohlschlegel, 2006). Under strict liability each company fixes a level of care which 
maximises total profits. The level of care actually chosen remains private knowledge of the 
firms, which have no incentive to disclose it to their competitors. Under the negligence rule 
courts use the private cost calculations of companies to fix due levels of care, and court 
decisions based on this information find their way into precedents and commentaries. The 
negligence regime therefore produces more generally accessible information about safety 
technology than the strict liability rule. If the efficient standard of care does not vary much 
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across firms within an industry, the negligence rule therefore produces valuable spill-overs 
from firm to firm via the legal system, which the strict liability rule cannot provide. Under the 
negligence rule, courts aggregate and transmit private knowledge as to the optimal care level 
from informed companies to companies with inferior information by adjusting the due level of 
care over time as a response to the information obtained from observing the activity level of 
informed companies. In contrast, under strict liability, courts cannot transmit private 
information as to the optimal care level because they do not have an instrument to reveal and 
aggregate information from prior accidents caused by informed companies. 
Information generated by the negligence rule alleviates principal-agent problems 
A similar argument can be put forward for cases of vicarious liability. Vicarious liability is 
the liability of a principal for a damage caused by her agent. If the agent causes damage to a 
third party, the third party may have a damage claim against the principal if the agent is liable 
either under strict liability or because she was negligent. If the agent is liable, two possible 
consequences arise. The liability of the agent may trigger automatically the liability of the 
principal. This is the most important rule. Alternatively, the principal is liable for the agent 
only if she has not reached a due level of care in selecting or supervising the agent.  
We consider here one of the four possible combinations of vicarious liability, the one 
which makes the principal strictly liable for the negligence of her agent. This rule can 
alleviate the principal-agent problem between employers and employees, as Demougin and 
Fluet (1999) have shown.  
A worker might hide her type from the principal, which might lead to a higher 
probability of damages after hiring the agent (hidden information), or she might choose a low 
level of care for her own benefit and at the expense of the principal (hidden action). To 
illustrate: Suppose that, in a chain store, a customer gets hurt because a sales person has 
dangerously stockpiled heavy goods. The chain store manager (the principal) can only 
imperfectly monitor the effort of the sales person (the agent). Suppose that the victim of an 
accident can show the negligent behaviour of the sales person in court. In other words, assume 
that the victim has better information about the effort of the agent than the principal. This is a 
likely situation in many instances in which the victim but not the employer can observe the 
care level of an employee.  
Under the negligence rule the manager obtains information in court about the 
negligent behaviour of his employee. This makes it possible for him to write a contingency 
contract under which the employee is sanctioned if she has negligently caused a damage 
which triggers vicarious liability. Put differently, the store manager may sanction the sales 
person if it is accurately established in court that he has negligently caused damage to the 
victim. This possibility alleviates the principal-agent problem within firms. 
In contrast, consider the principal-agent problem under a strict liability rule, under 
which the causation of a damage by the agent triggers the liability of the principal. Under this 
rule, no information about the agent’s negligence is generated in a judicial proceeding. 
Consequently, a contingency contract between the principal and the agent contingent on the 
negligent causation of an accident cannot be formed. By contrast, negligence generates 
information from the victim and thus allows for contracts which alleviate the principal-agent 
problems in firms. 
All in all it can be said that the negligence rule has the advantage of generating more 
valuable information for third parties than the strict liability rule. This is an advantage which 
has been overlooked in much of the literature.  
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VII. Strict Liability vs. Negligence if the Injurer’s Wealth is Lower than the Damage 
We have discussed the effect of under-compensation, which leads to under-deterrence under 
strict liability and to efficient deterrence or under-deterrence under the negligence regime. A 
particular case of under-compensation arises if the tortfeasor is judgment-proof, i.e., if her 
total wealth is lower than the damage. In order to analyse this case sufficiently, one has to 
differentiate between two case groups of such injurers. 
First group: The tortfeasor allocates costs of care which do not reduce her total wealth, 
for instance by allocating time and effort, but not money. Consider a car driver who takes 
optimal care when driving. Her level of care does not change her total wealth. In this case the 
only possible inefficient result is under-deterrence.  
Second group: The tortfeasor expends monetary costs of care which reduce her wealth. 
Take for example a medical doctor who invests in costly equipment to reduce damages or an 
auditor who hires more staff to make a better audit. In this case it is possible that the liability 
rule provides the judgment-proof injurer with incentives to reach a level of care which is too 
low or too high (Beard, 1990; Miceli and Segerson, 2003). 
The intuition behind the result in the second group of cases is that every increase in 
investment in care must reduce the expected liability by more than the effect of the increased 
care on the expected damages. When the injurer takes the decision to invest in care, this 
decision must reduce her expected liability. If for instance the injurer invests one Dollar more 
to increase her care level, the immediate consequence is that her liability is reduced by one 
Dollar in case of damage. Thus, in the eyes of the injurer, the cost of one Dollar of care is less 
than a Dollar, but rather a Dollar minus a Dollar multiplied with the accident probability. The 
injurer is in a situation as if her investment in care were cross-subsidized by a reduction of 
wealth, which is lost anyway in the case of an accident. If at the efficient level of care this 
reduction in the injurer’s perceived costs of care is higher than the effect that the injurer’s 
remaining assets are less than the damages, the injurer will invest more than the optimal level 
of care. This result is, however, restricted to a rule of strict liability. It cannot occur under 
negligence, provided that the due level of care is equal to the efficient level of care. The 
intuition behind this is straightforward: Under negligence, an injurer has never any incentive 
to invest more than the due level of care as this shifts all residual risks to the victim. 
Another surprising result of inefficient deterrence for the judgment-proof injurer under 
negligence and strict liability becomes apparent if one includes the rules of evidence for 
negligence (Demougin and Fluet, 2006). This rule can be either preponderance of evidence, as 
in common law jurisdictions, or full proof, as in several civil law jurisdictions. 
It is a well-established research result that under strict liability the judgment-proof 
tortfeasor usually prefers a lower level than the efficient level of care because his expected 
liability is lower than the expected harm he causes. This leads to under-compensation and thus 
– in the case of strict liability – to under-deterrence. 
We now turn to the analysis of the negligence rule. If under negligence the rule of 
evidence for negligence is full proof, a certain quota of all negligently caused damages may 
not be compensated. In anticipation of this consequence, the cost minimizing level of care of 
the tortfeasor is likely to be below the social optimum. Under preponderance of evidence for 
negligence, the careless tortfeasor faces a higher risk of being convicted and paying damages. 
This per se increases deterrence. A larger number of negligent tortfeasors have to pay 
compensation than under the full proof rule. However, under the preponderance of evidence 
rule more non-negligent tortfeasors are convicted as negligent and must pay compensation. 
This per se reduces deterrence because the incurrence of costs for the due level of care may 
not be rewarded by evading liability. Demougin and Fluet (2006) show, however, that the 
overall effect of the rules of proof for negligence leads to the following social ranking of 
negligence versus strict liability for judgement-proof tortfeasors.  
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(1) Negligence with preponderance of evidence for the proof of negligence 
(2) Strict liability 
(3) Negligence with full proof of negligence 
 
This result should, however, only be taken as a first approach to the problem rather than as a 
clear ranking of evidence rules in common law countries over those in civil law countries. In 
civil law countries full proof for negligence is only the baseline. It is often changed if the 
plaintiff has difficulties to show evidence and if information is asymmetric between plaintiff 
and defendant. In such cases courts may find other ways to alleviate the burden of proof for 
negligence or may even reverse the burden of proof. The overall effect of the multiplicity of 
such rules of evidence for negligence is still unknown. 
VIII. Liability and Contracts 
In the previous sections of this article, we concentrated on situations where parties do not 
enter into contractual relationships because of high transaction costs such as the costs of 
bargaining. The notion of transaction costs, however, is crucial for the analysis of liability and 
deterrence. Recall the basic insight of the Coase Theorem, which says that when parties can 
bargain with each other in order to settle their disagreements, their behaviour will be efficient 
regardless of the underlying rule of law. This implies that, whenever transaction costs are low, 
people enter into contractual relationships and the rules of contract law apply. Conversely, 
whenever transaction costs are high, people do not enter into contractual relationships and the 
rules of tort apply. There are a few areas, however, where tort law and contract law seem to 
merge, such as ‘products liability’ and ‘implicit contracts’.  
We now examine the allocative effects of various forms of liability rules in those cases 
where parties have entered into contractual relationships. We assume profit-maximising 
behaviour of firms and perfect competition. That is, the price of a product equals total unit 
costs including liability costs. It is also assumed that rational consumers buy a product only if 
the utility of the product exceeds its perceived price, i.e., the price actually charged plus 
expected accident costs not covered by liability payments. 
If the customers’ knowledge of risk is perfect, firms will take optimal care under any 
liability rule, even under the rule of no liability. This is because customers would immediately 
discover whether or not firms took less than optimal care. Thus, the perceived price of the 
product including expected losses would be higher than the product price of firms exercising 
optimal care. The potential loss of customers forces firms to exercise optimal care regardless 
of the underlying rule of liability. Also, the level of consumption is optimal because the price 
of the product as compared by customers with their utility includes expected accident losses. 
These results change, however, once we assume that customers have imperfect 
knowledge of the risk associated with a product. If customers cannot determine product risks, 
they will not reward firms for making products safer. Therefore, firms do not have any 
incentive to take optimal care unless there is some rule of liability. Moreover, under the rule 
of no liability and under the negligence rule, the level of consumption will not be optimal. 
Only under strict liability does the misperception of risks not matter because customers are 
fully compensated for their losses anyway, and market prices reflect the true risk of accident 
losses. In all other cases, market prices, and thus consumption, are either too high or too low. 
IX. Negligence under the Disguise of Strict Liability, Liability for Design Defects 
In product liability the general rule is strict liability. In the European Union the council 
directive 85/374/EEC provides “that the producer shall be liable for damage caused by a 
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defect in his product”. Upon closer inspection, however, it is unclear whether for design 
defects this is a rule of strict liability or of negligence. This depends on how courts 
conceptualise a design defect. They can use two alternative tests, the “risk utility test” or the 
“consumer awareness test”. Under the risk utility test the court asks whether the product was 
designed to be reasonably safe. In that case the product is not defective even if it caused an 
accident to the victim. The risk utility test therefore asks whether those who prepared the blue 
print for the product were negligent. The Learned Hand test must therefore be applied to the 
design of the product. If courts use this test, producer liability for design defects is negligence 
under the disguise of strict liability. 
Under the consumer awareness test courts ask whether consumers regard the product 
as safer than it actually is. In that case the producer is liable regardless of the product’s safety. 
This is an informational conceptualisation of the design defect.  
The risk utility test carries the disadvantage that civil courts often rely on biased 
expert opinion. They might face a “cartel of silence” of engineers who depend on the 
industries that produce the goods. This might lead to a standard of safety which is lower than 
optimal. Even if the standard is optimal, consumers who are unaware of the risk face 
unexpected damages and consequently buy too many of the dangerous goods. By contrast, the 
information required for the consumer awareness test can be provided by uninterested experts, 
for instance by pollsters. Under the consumer awareness test all unexpected damages are 
internalised in the price of the product. Therefore, the decision to buy reflects the product’s 
dangerousness, even though consumers underestimate the damages. The disadvantage is that 
the consumer might overuse the product and thus cause a higher than efficient level of harm. 
Courts usually cannot observe the excessive use and therefore cannot reduce damage 
compensation under the defence of contributory negligence. However, this result might also 
occur – albeit to a lesser extent – under the risk utility test if the consumer believes that the 
product is safer than it actually is. This applies even if she correctly believes that in case of 
damage there is no claim. It is, therefore, a question still open to empirical research whether 
the conceptualisation of “design defect” should be based on the producer’s negligence or on 
information asymmetry between the producer and the consumer.  
X. Multiple Tortfeasors 
We now turn to the case of multiple tortfeasors. Landes and Posner (1980) were the first 
authors to study the incentives to take care in the case of multiple tortfeasors, yet restricting 
their attention to negligence. For a more general discussion see Kornhauser (1989). 
We will consider situations where there is more than one injurer affecting the 
probability of accident losses. Furthermore, we need to distinguish between cases where 
injurers act independently with the victim’s harm being indivisible, and cases where injurers 
act together (in concert) to cause the victim’s harm. 
Under strict liability, injurers who act independently will not always act optimally in 
equilibrium. Assuming that each injurer is liable for a fixed fraction of losses only, any 
increase in the injurer’s exercise of care diminishes her liability by only a fraction of the 
reduction in expected losses, which induces the injurer to take a level of care that is clearly 
below the optimal level of care. When injurers act together, however, their minimisation 
problem obviously turns into a situation exactly equivalent to the one where there is only a 
single injurer. Thus, under strict liability and if injurers act in concert, injurers take optimal 
care. Note that this result is not obtained if injurers pay a fraction that is identical to their 
probability of causation. 
Under the rule of negligence, we obtain different results. Injurers will now act 
optimally (they will take due care) in equilibrium both in cases where they act independently 
and in cases where they act together, provided that the due level of care is optimally 
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determined, of course. Again, the analysis is straightforward and is precisely analogous to the 
previous analysis of situations of bilateral accidents. If one injurer alone fails to take due care, 
she will be held liable for the total amount of accident losses. A rationally self-interested 
injurer will now assume that another equally self-interested injurer has decided to exercise 
efficient precaution and, that being so, it is reasonable for that injurer also to exercise efficient 
precaution. Note that this outcome is unique and stable, and that it also holds true if injurers 
act in concert. 
XI. Risk Aversion, Liability Law and Insurance 
So far we have constrained our analysis to the case of risk-neutral parties. We will now extend 
the analysis by allowing for risk-averse individuals, and we will discuss the interaction 
between risk aversion, liability law and insurance.  
Risk aversion depends on the concavity of the utility function of wealth, i.e., the rate at 
which utility losses grow with losses of wealth. The concavity of the utility function implies 
that a $1,000 loss will cause greater harm to a person with assets of $10,000 than to a person 
with assets of $100,000. The shifting of risks from the more to the less risk-averse will raise 
social welfare given that social welfare is the sum of the individuals’ expected utilities. Social 
welfare will also increase if risks are shared among risk-averse parties, thereby reducing the 
potential extent of the losses that each party might suffer.  
One way of shifting and sharing risks is by insurance. Insurance can be described as a 
private system substitute for liability law in which contracts determine the allocation of risks. 
In the theory of insurance, a distinction has to be made between the cases in which the insured 
persons can influence risks and the cases in which they cannot. In the situations where the 
probability of damage cannot be affected by the actions taken by the insured persons, an 
insurance policy that offers complete coverage is socially optimal. If the insured, however, 
can influence risks, complete reimbursement creates the problem of moral hazard: The 
individual has no incentive to take any care at all. 
We now turn to the discussion of the interaction between risk aversion, liability law 
and insurance. Under the assumption that injurers are subject to liability, but that there is no 
insurance, the comparison of liability rules shows that the rule of negligence is preferable 
when victims are less risk-averse than injurers, and the rule of strict liability is preferable 
when the reverse holds true. The rationale behind these results is that under the negligence 
rule injurers will not bear any risk when taking due care, whereas victims will bear their 
losses. Thus, social welfare will be lower if victims are more risk-averse than injurers. The 
outcome is quite different under the rule of strict liability. Injurers will bear risk regardless of 
the level of care they take. If injurers are more risk-averse than victims, social welfare will 
decrease.  
Under the assumption that insurance is available, both the rule of negligence and the 
rule of strict liability yield socially optimal outcomes because individuals, if risk-averse, can 
obtain liability insurance. The more efficient rule is the one that costs less. Assuming, for 
instance, that consumers can insure more cheaply than manufacturers, strict product liability 
should be limited. 
 
The superiority of strict liability over negligence in cases of excessively dangerous activities 
and variable activity levels is not a general result, as Nell and Richter (2003) have shown. If 
courts cannot observe the optimal activity level and integrate this into the concept of 
negligence, strict liability outperforms negligence if injurers as well as victims are risk 
neutral, or if insurance markets are perfect (see section 7 above). If, however, insurance 
markets are imperfect or if insurance coverage is not available, this result loses generality. 
This becomes most obvious for very dangerous and catastrophic accidents, in which often one 
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tortfeasor causes harm to a large number of victims. In such a case strict liability would 
allocate all risk to one person whereas in the absence of insurance coverage, an efficient risk 
allocation would spread the risk between victims and injurer. This inefficient risk allocation 
will cause the injurer to choose an activity level which may be too low from a social point of 
view. In such a case a liability cap which re-distributes some of the damages to the injurers 
would improve the risk allocation and would prevent the injurer from choosing an 
inefficiently low level of activity. Alternatively, in such cases strict liability could be replaced 
by negligence. If then the harm to the injurer is a technical external effect which is not 
internalized by the price system, the overall welfare effect is unclear. On the one hand, 
negligence would improve the risk allocation as the damages are distributed on more 
shoulders. On the other hand, injurers would choose the efficient level of care, and would also 
choose an inefficiently high level of activity and thus increase the damages to an inefficiently 
high level. It depends on the parameters whether the overall benefit from a negligence rule 
would then be lower or higher than from a strict liability rule.  
 
If with imperfect insurance coverage liability works through a market and if victims must 
ultimately pay the price for the liability in a product price, the situation becomes different. In 
that case negligence strictly outperforms strict liability because the tortfeasor will reach an 
efficient level of care. But as the residual risk is borne by the victims, they will keep the level 
of activity down by buying fewer dangerous products. As the risk allocation is better under 
negligence than under strict liability, consumers and buyers will choose an activity level that 
is higher and socially superior to the extremely low activity level which a non-insured 
producer would choose under strict liability.  
XII. Relaxing Behavioural Assumptions of Rational Choice 
The large majority of tort law models assume a maximising tortfeasor who can map 
information into unbiased subjective probability values. This rules out optimistic and 
pessimistic attitudes of the injurer. It is, however, a well-known result of psychological 
research and behavioural economics that individuals tend to exhibit optimistic and pessimistic 
behaviour. For instance, individuals underestimate the likelihood that they will be involved in 
a car accident (Guppy, 1993). Furthermore, individuals tend to be unrealistically optimistic as 
to health or environmental risks (Sunstein, 1997; Weinstein, 1989). Furthermore, recent 
research suggests that individuals are pessimistic as to the risk of highly salient and 
catastrophic accidents such as earthquakes. They overestimate the probability of occurrence 
(Gigerenzer, 2005; Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler, 1998). 
If ambiguity is introduced, i.e., if the injurer can be either optimistic or pessimistic and 
consequently overestimates or underestimates the probability of an accident, the standard 
results of the efficiency of strict liability versus negligence change somewhat (Teitelbaum, 
2007). 
First, in the case of optimism the expected value of damages corrected for the 
influence of optimism is lower than the expected value under full rationality. Consequently, 
under strict liability the tortfeasor will reach a level of care which is lower than the efficient 
level of care. 
Second, in the case of pessimism the perceived value of damages is higher than under 
full rationality. Accordingly the level of care is higher than optimal. To illustrate: An 
optimistic car driver might not care to use the safety belt. And the widely reported asbestos 
cases have led to pessimism, which pushed up the investment expenditure for asbestos 
decontamination to an unreasonably high level. 
Third, under negligence different outcomes are possible. Assume that the due level of 
care is equal to the efficient level of care and that the tortfeasor has to pay the full damages. In 
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that case, the tortfeasor will reach the due and efficient level of care provided that the 
minimum of her perceived damage costs plus her costs of care are higher than the costs of due 
care. If these costs are, however, lower than the due costs of care, she will reach an 
inefficiently low level of care. The result changes if the difference principle (partial liability) 
is used. Under this principle, the tortfeasor can deduct those damages that would have 
occurred if she had reached the due level of care. Under that condition, it is certain that the 
perceived minimum of the costs of damage compensation and the costs of care are lower than 
the costs of due care. All in all, it can be said that in the case of optimism negligence leads to 
better results than strict liability in some cases. In the case of pessimism, negligence leads to 
better results than strict liability in all cases. This proposition holds for the basic model of 
unilateral accidents with a fixed activity level. 
 This leads Teitelbaum (2007) to the suggestion that negligence is more robust to 
ambiguity than strict liability and that negligence is likely to outperform strict liability if the 
injurer is pessimistic. This might again add to the explanation why the negligence rule and not 
the strict liability rule is regarded as the baseline in tort law in both common law and civil law 
countries. 
XIII. Comparing Strict Liability and Negligence 
Let us now summarise some of the main results of the previous sections. In the case of 
unilateral accidents, both the rule of strict liability and the rule of negligence achieve a 
socially optimal outcome, provided that courts set the level of due care equal to the socially 
optimal level of care, that the legal sanction equals the harm, and that the level of activity is 
constant. Relaxing these assumptions provides further insights favouring the rule of strict 
liability. Under strict liability, all the courts need to do is to determine causation and the size 
of the damage, whereas, under the negligence rule, the courts also need to determine the level 
of due care as a legal standard for the socially optimal level, and they have to determine the 
level of care actually taken in order to see whether the injurer was negligent or not. These 
information requirements are difficult and costly to satisfy. Moreover, the average costs of 
resolving claims tend to be higher under negligence. 
Another important advantage of the rule of strict liability emerges when allowing for 
variable levels of activity. Under negligence, the injurer has no reason to consider the effect 
that her activity has on others because she can escape liability by taking due care. Thus, the 
injurer will choose too high a level of activity. Under strict liability, the injurer internalises the 
total amount of social costs and reduces the level of activity to the socially optimal level. 
So far the results suggest that the rule of strict liability achieves socially optimal 
results provided that damages are set at the perfectly compensatory level. What happens, 
though, when an accident is bilateral, requiring both parties to take precaution against 
accidents? Now the efficiency of the rule of strict liability becomes problematic because, even 
though strict liability may at first create the right incentives for potential injurers, it will create 
an incentive problem for potential victims and will in return lead injurers to exercise 
suboptimal care. Strict liability is the mirror image of no liability. One rule fails to create 
incentives for precaution by the victim, the other rule fails to create incentives for precaution 
by the injurer. 
Therefore, our analysis suggests that in the case of bilateral accidents we should apply 
either a negligence rule or a rule of strict liability with the defence of contributory or relative 
negligence. All of them lead to socially optimal outcomes, provided that the courts set the 
legal standard of precaution at the efficient level, because self-interested agents have an 
incentive to choose the legal standard of care. 
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The efficiency of negligence disappears if negligence standards are ill-defined ex ante 
and if therefore the tortfeasor does not know at which level of care her probability of being 
held negligent becomes zero. Depending on the probability distribution function which maps 
a level of care onto a probability of being held negligent by the court, this might lead to 
under-deterrence or to over-deterrence or – by chance – to optimal deterrence. If a muddy 
standard of due care is combined with over-compensation, over-deterrence becomes  
inevitable, whenever the rate of over-compensation reaches a threshold level. The equivalent 
outcome shows up in cases of under-compensation.  
Strict liability also trumps negligence in the case of interdependency of victims, i.e., if 
increased care of one victim increases the damages of another victim.  
 
 The negligence rule is usually the base line around the world. In civil law countries, 
negligence is the general rule and strict liability is an exceptional rule or codified in specific 
statutes. In common law countries negligence is the baseline and strict liability is imposed in 
case of abnormal dangerousness of an activity (Posner, 2005; Rosenberg, 2007). Given the 
basic analysis of negligence versus strict liability it is difficult to see what explains this. Strict 
liability with the defence of contributory or comparative negligence usually leads to efficient 
results. Negligence leads to efficient results only if courts fix a due level of care which is 
equal to the efficient level of care, or if they fix a very high due level of care, such that the 
tortfeasor prefers the efficient level of care even if this leads to compensation. The relative 
merits of the negligence rule as the baseline are not visible under the basic analysis.  
 
A major drawback of the rule of strict liability in unilateral accidents, though, emerges 
when we relax the assumptions. Whenever damages are not perfectly compensatory, i.e., 
compensation is below the level that would make the victim indifferent between the case of 
no accident and that of an accident with compensation, the potential injurer does not have an 
efficient incentive to exercise the socially optimal level of care under the strict liability rule. A 
symmetric result obtains in case of over-compensation under strict liability The negligence 
rule is more robust with regard to deviations of damage compensation from damages, for 
instance if injurers are judgment-proof or remain undetected. This important advantage of the 
negligence rule however disappears if due levels of care are ill-defined ex ante.  
 
An important advantage of the negligence rule is that it produces more publicly 
available information on safety technologies than the strict liability rule. The level of due care 
which is generated by the court system becomes a public good. Under strict liability no such 
revelation mechanism for the technology to prevent damages exists. Moreover, under the 
negligence rule courts have to establish negligence and this information might be used within 
firms to improve the incentives for their workers and employees in cases of vicarious liability. 
Strict liability does not generate such information.  
The negligence rule is socially superior to the strict liability rule in the case of multiple 
tortfeasors. This case requires a sharing rule that distributes the damage compensation 
payments among tortfeasors. Often the individual contribution of a tortfeasor is not known. 
The courts use an equal share rule for all tortfeasors. This rule leads to under-deterrence under 
strict liability but to efficient deterrence under the negligence rule.  
Research which includes ambiguity of actors such as optimism and pessimism finds 
that the adverse effects of ambiguity are smaller under negligence than under strict liability. 
A comparison of negligence and strict liability must also include the effects of 
procedural rules as evidence rules for proving negligence. These rules vary across legal orders 
and their effects can reverse the social ranking of negligence versus strict liability.  
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